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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3512 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANTHONY THOMAS,  
a/k/a Ant 
 
     Anthony Thomas, 
                        Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 11-cr-00008-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 17, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: VANASKIE, BARRY and CUDAHY,
*
 Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 10, 2012 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
                                                 
*
  Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.   
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 BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Defendant Anthony Thomas appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence uncovered in a search of his vehicle, pursuant to a warrant, following 
his arrest.  He argues that his arrest and the subsequent search were not supported by 
probable cause.  He argues, as well, that the affidavit submitted with the warrant 
application was deficient, precluding good faith reliance.  We will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 On January 6, 2011, a grand jury indicted Thomas for (1) distribution of cocaine, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine and 
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and (4) 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  
Thomas pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress evidence obtained in a search of his 
vehicle. 
 The District Court held a hearing at which Philadelphia Police Officer Theresa 
Weaver testified to the following: On November 2, 2010, Officer Weaver received 
information from a confidential informant (“CI”) that a black male named Anthony 
Thomas, a/k/a “Ant,” was dealing in large quantities of cocaine in south and southwest 
Philadelphia, drove a tan Honda Accord with the Pennsylvania license plate, HGG-3378, 
and used the cell phone number, (267) 304-6048.  Weaver obtained a photograph of 
Thomas and showed it to the CI, who confirmed that it was the same person he had 
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described. Weaver then placed a call to the phone number the CI had provided and 
handed the phone to the CI, who arranged a drug sale for the following day.
1
 
 On November 3, 2010, using the CI’s phone, Weaver placed another call to the 
number provided and handed the phone to the CI; the man who answered informed him, 
“No, I’m not coming. No, just no.”  Later that day, Weaver’s supervisor, Sergeant 
Brereton, radioed that he saw a tan Honda in the parking lot of the Purple Orchid Strip 
Club on 61st Street and Passyunk Avenue.  Brereton reported that he saw the Honda pull 
up and park, and a white male exit from the passenger’s side and enter a white Grand 
Am.  The officers stopped the Grand Am as it drove away and arrested the passenger, 
Brian Lester.  They frisked Lester and found two green packets of cocaine.  Lester stated 
that he just purchased the cocaine from “Ant,” who drives a tan Honda, and provided a 
different cell phone number for Thomas than the one previously given by the CI.  Other 
officers followed the tan Honda as it left the parking lot and, before losing it, confirmed 
that Thomas was the driver. 
 On November 4, 2010, Weaver saw the tan Honda in the courthouse parking lot 
and followed Thomas inside.  Officers followed him as he exited the courthouse, went to 
his car, and drove to neighboring Delaware County.  They observed Thomas go to 931 
Barker Road in Sharon Hill, knock on the door, and enter with a key.  After about an hour 
and a half, Thomas left the building, returned to his car, and drove back to Philadelphia.  
Weaver’s partner then had Lester call Thomas to arrange a drug transaction at the Purple 
Orchid parking lot.  The officers, monitoring the parking lot, observed the tan Honda 
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 On cross, Weaver testified that a different CI placed this call. 
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arrive and a black female enter the passenger’s side of the vehicle.  She exited minutes 
later and entered another vehicle that left the area.  The tan Honda left shortly thereafter.  
Weaver told the officers to stop the Honda and arrest Thomas for selling cocaine to 
Lester the previous day.  Officer Simmons arrested Thomas, confiscated $1,014 from his 
person, and took him to the precinct for processing. 
 Almost an hour later, a K-9 officer arrived to scan the vehicle.  The dog alerted to 
the presence of narcotics on the front passenger’s side door and trunk.  The Honda was 
brought to the precinct for an inventory search and taken to the impoundment lot.  
Weaver prepared an application for a warrant to search the Honda, which issued on 
November 5th.  Pursuant to the warrant, Officers Simmons and Francis searched the 
vehicle that day.  They recovered cocaine and a loaded firearm from a hidden 
compartment. 
 Following a hearing, the District Court denied Thomas’s motion to suppress the 
evidence recovered in the search, concluding, as relevant here, that there was probable 
cause to search his car without a warrant and, in any event, that the officers who executed 
the warrant relied on the warrant in good faith.  Thomas subsequently pleaded guilty to 
all four counts, while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  
He was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment.  
II.  ANALYSIS 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, and de novo as to the legal conclusions 
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in light of these facts. United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010).
2
  
 Thomas argues that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and search his 
vehicle, and that the government cannot rely on the good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement because the affidavit in support of the warrant application was misleading 
and facially deficient.  We conclude that the officers had probable cause to arrest 
Thomas; that the warrant to search his vehicle was supported by probable cause; and that, 
in any event, the officers relied on the warrant in good faith. 
 There was ample probable cause supporting Thomas’s arrest.  Probable cause to 
arrest exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, a prudent person could “believe 
that a crime has been committed and the person to be arrested committed it.” United 
States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, the primary basis for probable 
cause was not the CI’s tip.  As even Thomas concedes, the phone number the CI provided 
led to a dead end when the man who answered ultimately declined to sell drugs.  The CI 
simply provided a good lead—the name of the suspect, a description of his vehicle, and 
the license plate.  It was the information received from Lester that was the more 
important basis of  probable cause to arrest Thomas.  Lester corroborated the suspicious 
activity described by the CI: he told the officers that he purchased cocaine from a man 
named “Ant” who drives a tan Honda—the man identified by the CI as a cocaine 
dealer—and arranged a drug transaction at a time and location at which Thomas 
appeared.  The officers also recovered cocaine from Lester immediately after seeing him 
leave the tan Honda that Thomas was observed driving shortly afterwards.  Given these 
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 Thomas does not challenge the District Court’s findings of fact. 
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facts, a prudent person could surely believe that Thomas had sold Lester cocaine. 
 In addition, the search of Thomas’s vehicle was lawful because it was conducted 
pursuant to a valid warrant, and, in any event, the officers relied on the warrant in good 
faith.  In the context of a search, probable cause requires a “fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. 
Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 554 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted).  Under the good 
faith exception, evidence discovered pursuant to an invalid warrant will not be 
suppressed if the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable. See id. at 
561 (discussing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)).  Typically, the mere 
existence of a warrant will suffice to demonstrate good faith. Id.  Reliance on a warrant 
will not be reasonable, however, when the application contains deliberate or reckless 
material falsehoods, or is so lacking in probable cause that no reasonable officer could 
rely on it. Id. at 561 n.19. 
 Thomas argues that the warrant was not supported by probable cause and the 
affidavit in support of the warrant application omitted supposedly exculpatory 
information.  He maintains that the government conceded the warrant’s invalidity at the 
suppression hearing.  We do not agree with this characterization.
3
  The government 
conceded that the affidavit was “poorly drafted,” not that the warrant was invalid.  (App. 
101a).   
 Furthermore, the information presented in the supporting affidavit was sufficient 
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 The District Court did not address the warrant’s validity in its findings, only observing, 
for reasons not entirely clear to us, that no “intellectual[ly] honest law trained person” 
would have signed it. (App. 119a). 
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to establish probable cause and, certainly, to support good faith reliance.  Thomas argues, 
first, that the omission of the CI’s inability to arrange a drug transaction with Thomas 
was material.  There is no requirement, however, that an officer include all failed 
investigatory attempts in the probable cause affidavit.  Moreover, this information, while 
not inculpatory, is far from exculpatory, and its inclusion would not have defeated 
probable cause. See United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2006).  Thomas 
also argues that the affidavit did not support a finding of probable cause because it failed 
to mention any indicia of the CI’s reliability, that the calls made to Thomas’s cell phone 
concerned arranging drug transactions, or Lester’s statement that he purchased the 
cocaine from “Ant.”  Although this information would have strengthened the application, 
the totality of the circumstances presented to the Magistrate—the CI’s identification of 
the vehicle and license plate; the officers’ observation of Lester exiting that vehicle and 
Thomas driving it; the cocaine discovered on Lester immediately thereafter; Brereton’s 
observation of the brief interaction with the black female shortly before Thomas’s arrest; 
and, most significantly, the K-9 alert—supported the finding that there was more than a 
fair probability that the tan Honda contained narcotics. See Stearn, 597 F.3d at 557 
(“[S]eemingly innocent activity [might] bec[o]me suspicious in light of the initial tip.” 
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983))).   
 Finally, even if the affidavit supporting the warrant application had not sufficiently 
demonstrated probable cause, it certainly was not so lacking that no officer could 
reasonably presume the warrant itself to be valid.  The affidavit did, indeed, contain some 
factual inaccuracies—for example, the license plate was incorrectly listed as “HJJ-3378” 
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and two different names were given for the K-9 dog who scanned Thomas’s car—but 
these minor inaccuracies surely do not indicate a deliberate or reckless disregard for the 
truth. Therefore, the good faith exception would apply even if the warrant had not been 
supported by probable cause. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
 
 
